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Default rateWe study the pathways by which borrowers and lenders influence house prices and default
rates via their choices and offerings of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgage products
(FRMs and ARMs) in a two-period setting. We extend previous literature on mortgage
choice as a tool for borrower risk screening under asymmetric information by incorporat-
ing house price externalities. The novelty in our setup is that house prices in the second
period are negatively affected by the first-period default rate. We show that when these
negative externalities are large, lenders may benefit by offering a lower ARM rate. This
outcome, in turn, influences the likelihood of a separating equilibrium in which high-risk
(low-risk) borrowers choose ARMs (FRMs) relative to a pooling equilibrium in which both
high-risk and low-risk borrowers receive the same contract. When the impact of the
negative house price externalities is small, it is more likely that lenders will offer pooling
contracts; however, when the impact of the house price externalities is large, it is more
likely that lenders will offer separating contracts. We also compare the equilibrium default
rates across different contract offerings and find that when the negative house price exter-
nalities are large, the pooling FRM contract or the separating contract tends to offer the
lowest default rate; however, when the negative house price externalities are small, the
pooling ARM contract may result in the lowest default rate.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the U.S. housing market began to decline in the
second quarter of 2006, the default rate for adjustable-rate
mortgage products (ARMs) has consistently exceeded that
for fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs),1 and this difference can be
attributed to at least two factors. First, some theory suggests
that ARMs may be preferred among high-risk borrowers
(Posey and Yavas, 2001). The fact that ARMs tend to be morepopular among subprime borrowers is consistent with this
suggestion (Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010). Second, ARMs
may also increase default risk via a payment shock if interest
rates increase sufficiently to leave the borrower liquidity
constrained, given his income. For these reasons, the popu-
larity of ARMs prior to 2005 has been implicated as a factor
contributing to the recent subprime mortgage crisis
(Scanlon et al., 2008; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010).
Beyond the direct contribution of ARMs to the default
rate, some researchers have also suggested that geographic
proximity to alternative mortgage products, such as hybrid
ARMs, may create spillovers that lead to higher default
among nearby property owners (Agarwal et al., 2012),
and thus potentially among borrowers with other types of
mortgage products. Although general economic conditions,
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uted to recent increases in default rates across mortgage
products,2 the fact that the default rate on FRMs has also
increased in recent years appears consistent with the idea
that house price externalities may exist. Moreover, a variety
of empirical evidence suggests that house price declines and
equity-driven defaults are contagious, for reasons of both
house prices and social norms/networks (Immergluck and
Smith, 2006; Schuetz et al., 2008; Harding et al., 2009; Lin
et al., 2009; Goodstein et al., 2011; Guiso et al., 2011;
Campbell et al., 2011), and that negative equity plays a lar-
ger role than unemployment rates in driving defaults
(Goodman et al., 2010). Thus, there is an implicit conduit
running from the distribution of loan products to the house
price level, and from house prices to default rates.3
However, the contribution of loan product to default
risk has also been found to vary with the economic envi-
ronment. An FRM can protect a borrower from inflation
but can raise equity-driven default risk. ARMs may exhibit
a lower or higher default rate than FRMs, depending both
on the movement of interest rates and on whether princi-
pal payments are deferred, as in the case of interest-only
or option ARMs (Vandell, 1978; LaCour-Little and Yang,
2010; Campbell and Cocco, 2011). Thus, the menu of
mortgage contracts that minimizes the equilibrium default
rate under house price externalities is not obvious a
priori.
In this paper, we study the pathways by which borrow-
ers and lenders influence house prices and default rates via
their choices and offerings of FRM and ARM products.4 We
extend the model of Posey and Yavas (2001), who demon-
strate that mortgage product can be used as a risk screening
tool, to incorporate house price externalities. In the model of
Posey and Yavas (2001), borrowers are either high risk or
low risk according to their likelihood of having a negative
income shock. As long as the disutility of default is
sufficiently high, high-risk borrowers tend to prefer ARM
contracts, while low-risk borrowers tend to prefer FRM con-
tracts. Intuitively, for an ARM contract, the potential costs
associated with a rise in interest rates are outweighed by
the potential benefits of a decline in interest rates for high
risks but not low risks. Thus, high risks will experience a
lower expected default rate under an ARM than under an
FRM. Posey and Yavas (2001) find that two separating equi-
libria and two pooling equilibria exist in under asymmetric2 For example, Makarov and Plantin (2009) show that correlated income
shocks can cause systemic defaults.
3 More generous loan terms may also inflate house purchase prices by
relaxing credit constraints and thus influence default rates. In this paper,
we focus on the way in which mortgage choice relates to post-purchase
house price movements and default rates, given an exogenous purchase
price; however, we hope to consider the role of endogenous purchase prices
in future work.
4 While our analysis is partly motivated by recent housing market events
and the empirical research mentioned above, please note that our goal here
is not to model recent events in realistic detail or to provide concrete policy
recommendations about how to avoid similar events in the future. Rather,
we aim (more generally) to investigate and illustrate the dynamics of
borrower and lender interaction in the context of both borrower income
shocks and negative house price externalities, and to derive intuition about
how the menu of mortgage contracts is related to the overall default rate in
this context.information. One of the separating equilibria provides posi-
tive profits to the lender, while the other does not. In both
cases, high risks receive the ARM and low risks receive the
FRM. These separating equilibria become increasingly likely
relative to pooling contracts as the proportion of high risks
in the population increases, and as the difference in the
likelihoods of an income shock becomes greater.
In our model, borrowers similarly self-select into either
FRMs or ARMs according to risk type. However, after
defaults from income shocks are observed, house prices
are determined, and an additional wave of defaults can
occur based on the change in house prices. We find that
house price externalities likewise have an impact on the
likelihood of separating versus pooling equilibria, and on
the equilibrium ARM interest rate, because they mediate
the equilibrium default rate under different mortgage
product menus via their interplay with the ARM interest
rate.
A variety of related papers have considered mortgage
choice under asymmetric information; beyond the work
of Posey and Yavas (2001), those most similar to ours
include papers by Brueckner (2000), Ben-Sharar (2006),
and LaCour-Little and Yang (2010). To the best our knowl-
edge, however, our paper is the first to explicitly consider
the linkages among mortgage product choices, house price
contagion, and equilibrium default rates under asymmetric
information. Our paper complements existing borrower
screening models by incorporating feedback from house
prices to default rates via an additional period in which
the price level is permitted to adjust and new defaults to
occur. We also derive implications for the aggregate
default rate, which may now depend on house price exter-
nalities, and provide insight into how to control the default
rate in different situations.
In the following section, we present the model. In sub-
sequent sections, we derive and interpret the results under
both full information, in which the borrower type is public
information, and under asymmetric information, in which
the borrower’s type is unknown to the lenders. In the final
section, we provide conclusions.2. Model
The model closely follows that of Posey and Yavas
(2001). Consider a competitive lending market where lend-
ers offer fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and/or adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs). We consider interest-only loans
with the loan amount as a balloon payment at the end of
the term. The loan amount is normalized to $1. There are
two periods. The lenders borrow short-term (one year) at
the spot market rate. At time t ¼ 0, each borrower has a
current income of Y, at which he qualifies for either an
ARM or an FRM loan. However, the borrower’s income
may change in future periods, t ¼ 1; 2. There are two types
of borrowers: type H (high risk) borrowers have a higher
probability than type L (low risk) borrowers of facing a
reduction in income, which may fall to y < Y at t ¼ 1.
Income remains constant from period 1 to period 2. The
probability that a type j borrower experiences a decline
in income is given by pj; j ¼ L;H; pH > pL. Let kj be the
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j¼L;Hkj ¼ 1. We assume that lenders are risk neutral
and that the borrowers are risk averse. The discount factor
is d.
Let r þ et be the interest rate at which a lender can bor-
row at time t ¼ 1;2, where et is a random variable with
density ftðetÞ and cumulative density FtðetÞ on ½et; et . At
the beginning of the first period (t ¼ 0), each lender deci-
des which contract(s) to offer, FRM and/or ARM, and sets
the interest rate for each type of mortgage contract. For
an FRM contract, the interest rate is denoted by i. For an
ARM contract, the interest rate is given by r þ aþ et , where
a represents the lender’s margin to compensate for poten-
tial default at time t ¼ 1;2.
The borrower chooses a contract and buys a house at
unit price p0 ¼ 1 at the beginning of the first period
(t ¼ 0). Since the loan is an interest-only product, the bor-
rower pays interest only at the end of the first period
(t ¼ 1) and pays both interest and principle at the end of
second period (t ¼ 2). The borrower can default in either
period. If he defaults at the end of the first period, the
house price at the end of the second period is negatively
impacted and is represented by p2 ¼ 1 qm, where q < 1
is the house value depreciation coefficient and m is the rate
of default at the end of the first period. We assume that the
borrower can only sell the house in the second period and
that y < i < Y . Thus, an FRM borrower defaults at the end
of the first period if his income falls. In contrast, an ARM
borrower may or may not default if his income falls,
because his payment at the end of the first period is
r þ aþ e1, which could be greater or less than Y ðyÞ. Conse-
quently, an FRM borrower will only default in the second
period if the house value falls sufficiently, while whether
an ARM borrower defaults depends on both the house
value and the second-period payment. If the price of the
house is too low in the second period, the borrower will
choose to default. An FRM borrower j will default at the
end of the second period if the sum of the house value
and income, p2ðmÞ þ Y , is less than the payment, 1þ ij.5
Since a borrower j with a reduction in income may not
default at t ¼ 2 under an ARM contract, default occurs if
the sum of the house value, income and the remainder of
the first period income, p2ðmÞ þ Y or p2ðmÞ þ y, is less than
the payment, 1þ r þ aj þ e2. For now, assume that
r þ aþ et < y < i < Y < r þ aþ et . Finally, the borrower sells
the house at time t ¼ 2.
3. Borrower’s problem
Each borrower chooses a mortgage contract to maxi-
mize his expected utility. We assume that each borrower
has an identical utility function that is strictly concave in
wealth. When a default occurs, each borrower experiences
a disutility D that includes all the costs associated with a
default, such as a lowered credit rating, emotional and
physical distress, and so forth. Following the setup by5 In this setup, the borrowers choose to default strategically and may
default even if income is greater than the payment. Moreover, as we discuss
in more detail below, we consider the default decision in the context of a
sufficiently high disutility of default.Posey and Yavas (2001), the expected utility of a borrower
of type j; j ¼ H; L, from an FRM contract is
VFði;pj;mÞ¼ð1pjÞUðY iÞþpjðUð0ÞDÞþdð1pjÞ
 UðMax½Y iqm;0ÞD 1Max½Y iqm;0
Y iqm
  
ð1Þ
where the first two terms represent borrower j’s first-
period utility and the third term represents borrower j0s
second-period utility. In the first period, borrower j pays
the interest i when his income remains Y; thus, the bor-
rower’s remaining wealth is Y  i. When his income falls
to y, borrower j instead pays y to the lender, and his
remaining wealth is zero. In the second period, the house
value falls below 1 due to defaults in the first period. If
the sum of equity and income is greater than the total pay-
ment (including both interest and principle), the borrower
will not default, and his remaining wealth is Y  iþ p2  1,
which is Y  i qm. However, if the sum of equity and
income together is less than the total payment, the bor-
rower will default, and his remaining wealth is zero. The
expression 1 Max½Yiqm;0Yiqm is simply equal to 1 when
Y  i qm 6 0 and is equal to zero when Y  i qm > 0.
Assume that Y is large enough so that Y  i qm > 0. We
then have
VFði;pj;mÞ ¼ ð1 pjÞUðY  iÞ þ pjðUð0Þ  DÞ
þ dð1 pjÞUðY  i qmÞ ð2Þ
If borrower j chooses an ARM contract, his expected utility
is given by
VAða;pj;mÞ¼ð1pjÞ
Z Yra
e1
ðUðYrae1ÞþdbAÞf1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
Yra
ðUð0ÞDÞf1ðe1Þde1
)
þpj
Z yra
e1
ðUðyrae1ÞþdbBÞf1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
yra
ðUð0ÞDÞf1ðe1Þde1
)
:
where
bA ¼ Z Min½e2 ;Yraqm
e2
UðY  r  a e2  qmÞf2ðe2Þde2
þ
Z e2
Max½e2 ;Yraqm
ðUð0Þ  DÞf2ðe2Þde2 and
bB ¼ Z Min½e2 ;yraqm
e2
Uðy r  a e2  qmÞf2ðe2Þde2
þ
Z e2
Max½e2 ;yraqm
ðUð0Þ  DÞÞf2ðe2Þde2
The expression bA represents utility at time t ¼ 2 when
there is no reduction in income, while the expression bB
represents utility in the second period when income falls.
It is easy to see that bA > bB. The first term represents bor-
rower j’s utility when there is no reduction in income,
while the second term reflects borrower j0s utility when
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at the end of the first period if there is no default; other-
wise, he will choose to default, which leads to a remaining
wealth of zero and to disutilities of default. When he does
not default at the end of the first period, borrower j will
proceed to the second period. At that point, his action
depends on the realized house value p2ðmÞ and the random
variable e2. The higher p2ðmÞ is, the less likely it is that an
equity-driven default will occur. The borrower defaults if
the house value is so low or e2 is so high that the sum of
equity and income is less than the total payment,
r þ aþ e2 þ 1.
Suppose that both FRM and ARM contracts are offered
and the contracts are designed so that the low-risk bor-
rowers are attracted to the FRM contract and the high-
risk borrowers are attracted to the ARM contract, and
let DVði;a; pLÞ ¼ VFði; pL;mÞ  VAða; pL; emÞ be the differ-
ence in the utilities derived from an FRM contract and
an ARM contract for low-risk borrowers. The reason
why the first-period default rates are different in VF
and VA is as follows: If the low-risk borrowers were to
choose the ARM contract instead of the FRM contract,
given that the high-risk borrowers choose the ARM con-
tract as well, the expression for the first-period default
rate would be
emL ¼X
j¼L;H
kj ð1 pjÞ
Z e1
Yra
f1ðe1Þde1 þ pj
Z e1
yra
f1ðe1Þde1
( )
instead of VFði; pj;mÞ where
m¼ kH ð1pHÞ
Z e1
Yra
f ðe1Þde1þpH
Z e1
yra
f ðe1Þde1
( )
þkLpL:
Conversely, if the high-risk borrowers were to choose the
FRM contract instead, given that the low-risk borrowers
choose the FRM contract as well, the expression for the
first-period default rate would be
emH ¼X
j¼L;H
kjpj
instead of m. Thus, we have DVði;a; pHÞ
¼ VFði; pH; emHÞ  VAða; pH;mÞ.
It can be shown easily that @DVði;a;pjÞ
@i < 0 and
@DVði;a;pjÞ
@a > 0.
Let iða; p; jÞ be the FRM rate such that DVði;a; pjÞ ¼ 0. Then,
we have the following results:
Lemma 1. There exists a sufficiently large D such that
@DVði;a;pjÞ
@pj
< 0.Proposition 2. If D is sufficiently large such that @DVði;a;pjÞ
@pj
< 0,
then @iða;pj ;jÞ
@pj
< 0.
Similar to the result of Posey and Yavas (2001), Propo-
sition 2 shows that, as pj increases, the difference between
the utility from choosing an FRM contract and the utility
from choosing an ARM contract becomes smaller. Since
pH > pL, low-risk borrowers will not prefer an ARM con-
tract, while high-risk borrowers prefer an FRM contract.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that D is sufficiently
large.4. Lender’s problem: full information
We first consider the scenario in which the type of bor-
rower is known to the lender. Assuming a competitive
market, we develop the zero-profit contracts for each type
of borrower.
4.1. FRM contracts
The lender’s expected payoff when making an FRM loan
to a type j borrower is characterized by
PFðij;pjÞ ¼ ð1 pjÞðij  r  Eðe1ÞÞ þ pjðy r  Eðe1ÞÞ
þ dð1 pjÞðij  r  Eðe2ÞÞ
since Y  qm ij P 0. The lender’s earnings expression at
the end of the first period includes two parts. If the bor-
rower’s income remains Y at the end of the first period, he
does not default, and the lender earns ij  r  Eðe1Þ; if the
borrower’s income decreases to y, he defaults, and the len-
der only collects y. Note that the house value at t ¼ 1
remains the same as at the beginning of the first period,
at t ¼ 0. At the end of the second period, the payments
are collected from the borrowers with income Y, and these
payments are discounted by d. Unlike in the first period, the
lender’s earnings expression at t ¼ 2 includes only one
term. Since Y  qm ij P 0 by assumption, the expected
earnings are ij  r  Eðe1Þ. Differentiating PFðij; pjÞ with
respect to ij and pj, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. dP
F
dij
> 0 and dP
F
dpj
< 0.
4.2. ARM contracts
Now consider an ARM contract. The lender’s expected
payoff for making an ARM loan to a type j borrower is char-
acterized by
PAðaj;pj;mÞ ¼ ð1 pjÞ
Z Yraj
e1
ðr þ aj þ e1 þ dAÞf1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
Yraj
Yf1ðe1Þde1
)
þ pj
Z yraj
e1
ðr þ aj
(
þ e1 þ dBÞf1ðe1Þde1 þ
Z e1
yraj
yf1ðe1Þde1
)

Z e1
e1
ðr þ e1Þf1ðe1Þde1
 d
Z e2
e2
ðr þ e2Þf2ðe2Þde2 ð3Þ
and
A ¼
Z Min½e2 ;Yrajqm
e2
ðr þ aj þ e2Þf2ðe2Þde2
þ
Z e2
Max½e2 ;Yrajqm
ðY  qmÞf2ðe2Þde2
B ¼
Z Min½e2 ;yrajqm
e2
ðr þ aj þ e2Þf2ðe2Þde2
þ
Z e2
Max½e2 ;yrajqm
ðy qmÞf2ðe2Þde2
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t ¼ 2 when there is no reduction in income, while the
expression B represents the lender’s earnings in the second
period when the borrower’s income falls. Under an ARM
contract, a borrower with reduced income may not default
in the first period if e1 is low enough. With probability
1 pj, borrower j will not experience a reduction in
income; thus, the first term in expression (3) represents
total expected earnings when there is no reduction in
income, while the second term represents total expected
earnings when there is a reduction in income. At time
t ¼ 2, depending on the house value p2 and the random
variable e2, the borrower will choose to default if the
sum of equity and income , p2ðmÞ þ Y or p2ðmÞ þ y, is less
than the payment 1þ r þ aj þ e2. Differentiating
PAðaj; pj;mÞ with respect to aj; pj and m yields the follow-
ing results:
Lemma 4. dP
A
dpj
< 0; @P
A
@m < 0, and
dPA
daj
70.
Proof. It is a straightforward matter to prove dP
A
dpj
< 0 and
@PA
@m < 0; therefore, we omit the proof. Taking the deriva-
tives of A and B with respect to aj, we obtain
dA
daj
¼
Z Min½e2 ;Yrajqm
e2
f2ðe2Þde2  q
dm
daj

Z e2
Max½e2 ;Yrajqm
f2ðe2Þde270
and
dB
daj
¼
Z Min½e2 ;yrajqm
e2
f2ðe2Þde2  q
dm
daj

Z e2
Max½e2 ;yrajqm
f2ðe2Þde270:
These results show that the lender’s earnings in the second
period may or may not increase as the ARM rate increases,
depending on the magnitude of the negative house price
externalities. In the presence of large negative house price
externalities, a higher ARM rate triggers an additional loss
of earnings that would not otherwise occur. That is,
q dmdaj
R e2
Max½e2 ;Yrajqm
f2ðe2Þde2 under high income, or
q dmdaj
R e2
Max½e2 ;yrajqm
f2ðe2Þde2 under low income. This loss,
in turn, affects the change in total earnings, which is repre-
sented by
dPA
daj
¼ ð1 pjÞ dAf1ðY  r  ajÞ þ 1þ d
dA
daj
 
F1ðY  r  ajÞ
 
þ pj dBf1ðy r  ajÞ þ 1þ d
dB
daj
 
F1ðy r  ajÞ
 
:
It can be seen that the sign of expression (4) remains unde-
termined. h
To understand dP
A
daj
further, we analyze the change in
first-period earnings as well. Let PAi denote the earnings
in period i; then,dPA1
daj
¼ ð1 pjÞF1ðY  r  ajÞ þ pjF1ðy r  ajÞ > 0
This expression indicates that the lender’s first-period
earnings are always increasing in the ARM rate. We then
have the following proposition:Proposition 5. For a sufficiently small d; dP
A
daj
> 0.
When the discount factor is sufficiently small, second-
period earnings become insignificant; thus, the negative
effect of decreasing housing prices does not cause a major
shift in total earnings. As a result, the effect on first-period
earnings dominates the change in total earnings. Since
dPA1
daj
> 0, total earnings will increase as well.
Assume that D is sufficiently large, by Proposition 2,
so that the lender never offers an FRM contract to
high-risk borrowers while offering an ARM contract
to low-risk borrowers. We study the following three
cases:
 Case I: The lender offers FRM contracts only, with rate iL
offered to low-risk borrowers and rate iH offered to
high-risk borrowers.
 Case II: The lender offers ARM contracts only, with rate
aL offered to low-risk borrowers and rate aH offered to
high-risk borrowers.
 Case III: The lender offers an FRM contract with rate iL
to low-risk borrowers and an ARM contract with rate
aH to high-risk borrowers.
One can see easily that the equilibrium FRM rates and ARM
rates are case dependent. Thus, we denote by ikj and akj the
equilibrium FRM rate and ARM rate for borrower j in case
k. Moreover, let mk and Tk be the first-period and total
default rates in case k. In the following sections, we derive
the equilibrium conditions and the default rate for each
case.
Case I: the lender offers FRM contracts to both borrower
types.
In this case, the FRM rates iIL and i
I
H solve P
FðiIj; pj;mIÞ ¼
0 subject to VFðiIJ; pj;mIÞP 0. We have mI ¼
P
j¼L;Hkjpj and
TI ¼
P
j¼L;Hkjpj.
Case II: the lender offers ARM contracts to both borrower
types.
In this case, the ARM rates aIIj solve
PAðaIIH;pH;mIIÞ ¼ 0
PAðaIIL ;pL;mIIÞ ¼ 0
(
subject to VAðaIIj ; pj;mIIÞP 0. We have
mIIðaIIL ;aIIHÞ
¼
X
j¼L;H
kj ð1 pjÞ
Z e1
YraII
j
f1ðe1Þde1 þ pj
Z e1
yraII
j
f1ðe1Þde1
( )
:
and
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X
j¼L;H
kj ð1pjÞ
Z YraII
j
e1
Z e2
Max½e2 ;YraIIj qm
II 
f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1
((
þ
Z e1
YraII
j
f1ðe1Þde1
)
þpj
Z yraII
j
e1
Z e2
Max½e2 ;yraIIj qm
f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
yraII
j
f1ðe1Þde1
))
:
Taking the derivatives of mII with respect to aj, we obtain
dmII
daj
¼
X
j¼L;H
kjfð1pjÞf1ðY rajÞþpjf1ðy rajÞg>0
Case III: the lender offers high-risk borrowers an ARM contract
and low-risk borrowers an FRM contract.
In this case, iIIIL and aIIIH satisfy
PFðiIIIL ;pL;mIIIÞ ¼ 0
PAðaIIIH ; pH;mIIIÞ ¼ 0
(
subject to VAðaIIIH ; pH;mIIIÞ;V
FðiIIIL ; pL;mIIIÞP 0. We have
mIIIðaIIIH Þ¼kH ð1pHÞ
Z e1
YraIIIH
f ðe1Þde1þpH
Z e1
yraIIIH
f ðe1Þde1
( )
þkLpL: ð5Þ
and
TIII ¼ kLpL þ kHð1 pHÞZ Yra
HIII
e1
Z e2
Max½e2 ;YraHIIIqm
III 
f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
Yra
HIII
f1ðe1Þde1
)
þ kHpH
Z yra
HIII
e1
Z e2
Max½e2 ;yraHIIIqm
III 
f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1
(
þ
Z e1
yra
HIII
f1ðe1Þde1
)
; ð6Þ
As in Case II, we obtain dm
III
daIII
j
> 0.
4.3. Case comparison
Proposition 6. If dP
A
dakj
< 0 and pL is sufficiently small, then
aIIH < a
III
H ; if
dPA
dakj
< 0 and pL is sufficiently large, then
aIIH > a
III
H .
Proposition 6 provides sufficient conditions for the
ranking of ARM rates in Cases II and III. The condition
dPA
dak
j
< 0 indicates that the negative house price externality
has a large impact on second-period earnings and that total
earnings decrease in the ARM rates; moreover, the condi-
tion that pL be sufficiently small implies that low-risk bor-
rowers have a very low probability of a negative income
shock. The comparison of ARM rates is crucial in compar-
ing the total default rate, as we will show in the following
proposition. It is obvious that TI > TIII , so we focus on the
comparison of TII and TIII .
Proposition 7. If pL is sufficiently small and aIIH > a
III
H , then
TI; TII > TIII . If pL is sufficiently large and aIIH < a
III
H , then
TII < TIII < TI.Proposition 7 provides sufficient conditions for the
rankings of total default rates. It suggests that the contracts
in Case III incur the lowest default rate when pL is suffi-
ciently small and aIIH > aIIIH , while the contracts in Case II
incur the lowest default rate when pL is sufficiently large
and aIIH < aIIIH . Intuitively, if pL is sufficiently small, the con-
tract which avoids default by low-risk borrowers at the
high-income level lowers the total default rate in the mar-
ket. This is indeed the case if low-risk borrowers are
offered FRM contracts, since by assumption low-risk bor-
rowers do not default at the high-income level under
FRM contracts. The condition aIIH > aIIIH induces a higher
default rate for high-risk borrowers in Case II than in Case
III. As a result, the total default rate is lower in Case III than
in Case II. On the other hand, if pL is sufficiently large, an
FRM contract increases the default rate among low-risk
borrowers and should, therefore, be avoided in order to
lower the total default rate. Therefore, under the condition
that aIIH < aIIIH , offering ARM contracts to both types of bor-
rowers reduces the total default rate in the market.
This proposition also indicates that, as pL increases, the
marginal increase in the total default rate becomes smaller
in Case II than in Case III, so that, after a certain level, it
becomes favorable to implement the contracts in Case II
in order to control the total default rate. Therefore, we have
the following further result:
Proposition 8. @T
IIITII
@pL
> 0; @T
IIITII
@Y > 0 and
@TIIITII
@y > 0.
Proposition 8 shows that, as the values of pL;Y , and y
increase, it is more likely that the contracts in Case II
induce a lower default rate. As income increases, the
probability of default goes down for borrowers under
ARM contracts, while the probability of default remains
the same for borrowers under FRM contracts. With regard
to the effect of a change in pL, the marginal decrease in the
default rate in Case II is larger than the one in Case III.
Consequently, the contracts in Case II become more
favorable for controlling the default rate.5. Lender’s problem: asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information when the borrower’s
type is private information, lenders have to offer the same
contract to all borrowers. In this case, two outcomes may
arise: a pooling equilibrium in which lenders offer one
mortgage type (either an FRM contract or an ARM con-
tract); or, alternatively, a separating equilibrium in which
lenders offer both FRM and ARM contracts and borrowers
self-select into each contract.
5.1. Pooling equilibria
A pooling FRM contract i solves
kPFði; pL;mIÞ þ ð1 kÞPFði

;pH;m
IÞ ¼ 0;
and a pooling ARM contract a solves
kPAða; pL;mIIðaÞÞ þ ð1 kÞP
Aða;pH;mIIðaÞÞ ¼ 0:
To derive the conditions for both pooling and separating
equilibria, we need to compare i with iIIIL , and a with
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III
L and aIIIH are the rates offered under
symmetric information. To simplify the analysis, we
assume i > iIIIL .
6 One can see easily that if dP
A
daj
< 0;a > aIIH;
otherwise, a < aIIH .
7 Therefore, we have the following com-
parison between a and aIIIH :
Lemma 9. If dP
A
daj
< 0 and aIIH > a
III
H , we have a
 > aIIIH ; if
dPA
daj
> 0 and aIIH < a
III
H , we have a
 < aIIIH . Otherwise, a

7aIIIH .Proof. We can show easily that if dP
A
daj
< 0;a > aIIH; other-
wise, a < aIIH . We are able to compare a with aIIH because
the lenders only offer ARM contracts in both situations, thus
they have the same functional form for the first period
default rate m, whereas, under case III with symmetric infor-
mation, the lenders offer both ARM and FRM contract. h
Lemma 9 states sufficient conditions for comparing a
and aIIIH . It implies that a > aIIIH is more likely to occur if
dPA
daj
< 0, and that a < aIIIH is more likely to occur if dP
A
daj
> 0.
When dP
A
dak
j
< 0, the ARM rate offered to high-risk borrowers
is smaller than the ARM rate offered to low-risk borrowers.
As a result, the pooling ARM rate may be higher than the
ARM rate offered to the high-risk borrowers in a separating
contract. This result is surprising given the conventional
wisdom that, since the lender is not able to screen the
low-risk borrowers and the high-risk borrowers under a
pooling contract, the pooling contract rate should always
be lower than the rate offered to the high-risk borrowers.
Recall that the condition dP
A
dak
j
< 0 indicates that the neg-
ative house price externality has a large impact on second-
period earnings, so that total earnings decrease in ARM
rates. Therefore, the implication is that negative house
price externalities provide a favorable environment for
a > aIIIH to occur. This indeed plays a crucial role in deter-
mining the likelihood of a separating contract or a pooling
contract, as we will show in the following propositions.
Proposition 10. Suppose a > aIIIH ; then there exists a pool-
ing equilibrium with an ARM rate a if and only if 1)
i P iða; pL;mI;mIIÞ and 2) iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;
mIIÞ < iIIIL . Under condition 2), if dP
A
daj
> 0, we must also have
iIIIL P iða; pL;mIII;mIIÞ.
Proposition 10 states necessary and sufficient condi-
tions to ensure a pooling ARM contract when the impact
of negative house price externalities is large enough that
a > aIIIH . One condition is i
 P iða; pL;mI;mIIÞ, which guar-
antees that the lender has no incentive to offer a pooling
FRM contract, whereas the other condition is
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L , which guarantees
that the lender has no incentive to offer a separating6 It is reasonable to assume i > iIIIL given that P
F ði; pL ;mIÞ > PF ði
III
L ;
pL ;m
IIIÞ ¼ 0.
7 We are able to compare a with aIIH because the lenders offer only ARM
contracts in both situations; thus, they have the same functional form for
the first-period default rate m.contract. These conditions indicate that, when a > aIIIH ,
the value of iIIIL needs to be high enough to ensure a pooling
ARM contract. However, as we will show later, this is no
longer the case when a 6 aIIIH .
Proposition 11. Suppose a 6 aIIIH ; then there exists a
pooling equilibrium with an ARM rate a if and only if
i P iða; pL;mI;mIIÞ. Under condition i
III
L < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;
mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ and
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0, we must also have
iIIIL P iða; pH;mI;mIIIÞ.
Proposition 11 states necessary and sufficient condi-
tions to ensure a pooling ARM contract when the impact
of negative house price externalities is not so large that
a 6 aIIIH . Unlike the situation in which a > aIIIH , a pooling
ARM contract can exist under all ranges of iIIIL when
a 6 aIIIH . As a result, the likelihood of a pooling ARM con-
tract is higher under a 6 aIIIH . In other words, when the
impact of the negative house price externalities is moder-
ate, a pooling ARM contract is more likely to be offered by
the lender than when the impact of the negative house
price externalities is large.
Proposition 12. There exists a pooling equilibrium with an
FRM rate i if and only if: 1) i 6 iða; pH;mI;mIIÞ and
dPAða;pjÞ
da > 0, 2) i

< iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ
An important implication of Propositions 10 and 11 is
that the negative house price externalities have a negative
impact on the likelihood of a pooling contract. Such impact
is even more pronounced for a pooling FRM contract. As
shown in Proposition 12, so long as the lender’s total earn-
ings decrease in ARM rates, a pooling FRM contract is impos-
sible, whereas a pooling ARM contract may still exist even
when the lender’s total earnings decrease in ARM rates. This
result is consistent with the results for a pooling ARM con-
tract, in the sense that the negative house price externalities
decrease the likelihood of a pooling contract being offered.
This latter result is due to the fact that when the impact of
the negative house price externalities is large, the ARM rate
offered tends to be small; this makes a pooling ARM contract
more attractive than a pooling FRM contract.
The rationale behind the results from Propositions 10–
12 is as follows. In the presence of a negative relationship
between the lender’s payoff and the ARM rate, dP
A
dak
j
< 0 , the
ARM rate offered in either a separating contract or a pool-
ing ARM contract tends to be smaller. This has two effects
on the equilibrium. One effect is on the desirability of a
pooling ARM contract in relation to a separating contract.
Since the lender no longer benefits from a higher ARM rate,
the high-risk borrowers are more likely to be offered a
lower ARM rate in a separating contract than in an ARM
pooling contract. This makes a pooling ARM contract less
desirable to the high-risk borrowers, and it provides less
incentive for the lender to offer a pooling ARM contract
than to offer a separating contract. The second effect con-
cerns the comparison between a pooling FRM contract
and a pooling ARM contract. Since the ARM rate tends to
be lower, while the FRM rate is not affected by dP
A
dak
j
< 0, a
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rowers than a pooling ARM contract. As a result, it is more
likely that the lender will prefer a pooling ARM contract to
a pooling FRM contract. In summary, when dP
A
dak
j
< 0, the
separating contract is more likely preferred by the lender
than a pooling ARM contract, and a pooling ARM contract
is more likely preferred by the lender than a pooling FRM
contract.
5.2. Separating equilibria
Proposition 13. There exists a separating equilibrium
ðiIIIL ;aIIIH Þ with zero profits if and only if a > aIIIH and
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 i
III
L 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ.
This result implies that when a 6 aIIIH , there does not
exist a separating equilibrium with zero profits. Since
a > aIIIH more likely occurs when dP
A
dak
j
< 0, it follows that
the negative house price externalities increase the likeli-
hood that a separating contract exists, which is consistent
with the results from the last section. In the following
proposition, we present the separating equilibria with
positive profits.
Proposition 14. There exists a separating equilibrium
(eiL ;aIIIH ) where iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼ eiL if and only if: (1)
i > eiL , (2) a > aIIIH , and (3) iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ <
iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. There exists a separating equilibrium
(iIIIL ; eaH ) where iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼ iIIIL if and only if: (1)
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0, (2) iða
; pH;m
I;mIIÞ > iIIIL , and (3) i
III
L < iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. There exists a separating equi-
librium (iIIIL ; eaH ) where iIIIL ¼ iðeaH; pL;mIII;mIIÞ if and only if:
(1) dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0, (2) iða
; pL;m
III;mIIÞ > iIIIL , and (3)
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L .
8
Proposition 14 states three possible separating equilibria
with positive profits. It shows that there may exist two sep-
arating equilibria under the condition that iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ, and one separating equilibrium
under the condition that iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;TS ¼
kLpL þ kHð1 pHÞ
R YraS
e1
R e2
Max e2 ;YraSqmS½  f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1 þ
R e1
YraS f1ðe1Þde1
 
þkHpH
R yraS
e1
R e2
Max e2 ;yraSqmS½  f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1 þ
R e1
yraS f1ðe1Þde1
 mIII;mIIÞ < iIIIL . Similar to the result in Proposition 13,
a > aIIIH is the necessary condition for both the first and third
equilibria. Although the second equilibrium does not
require a > aIIIH , the condition
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0 must be satisfied.
This implies that, if the impact from the negative house price8 The conditions for this equilibrium also imply that a > aIIIH .externalities is not sufficiently large that dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0 and
a 6 aIIIH , a separating contract cannot exist. Once again,
Proposition 14 demonstrates the crucial role that both con-
ditions a > aIIIH and
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0 play in supporting a separat-
ing contract. This result provides insight concerning when
and whether a separating contract should be adopted.
Despite the complicated nature of the model, the impli-
cation under asymmetric information is clear. As the
impact from the negative house price externalities
becomes larger, separating contracts become more desir-
able, while pooling contracts become less desirable. In
the meantime, an ARM pooling contract is more likely to
be offered than an FRM pooling contract. If the impact from
the negative house price externalities is small enough that
dPAða;pjÞ
da > 0 and a

6 aIIIH , the lender will tend to offer pool-
ing contracts; if the impact from the house price external-
ities is large enough that dP
Aða;pjÞ
da < 0, then the lender will
tend to offer separating contracts or sometimes an ARM
pooling contract.5.3. Comparison of default rates
In this section, we compare the default rates under
asymmetric information. Let PF represent the pooling
FRM contract, PA represent the pooling ARM contract,
and S represent the separating contract. Let ðiS;aSÞ be the
rates offered in a separating contract. Then we have the fol-
lowing results regarding the first-period and total default
rates mk and Tk, where k 2 fPF; PA; Sg.
1. mPF ¼
P
j¼L;Hkjpj and T
PF ¼
P
j¼L;Hkjpj
2. mPA¼
P
j¼L;Hkj ð1pjÞ
R e1
Yra f1ðe1Þde1þpj
R e1
yra f1ðe1Þde1
n o
and TPA¼
P
j¼L;Hkj ð1pjÞ
R Yra
e1
R e2
Max e2 ;YraqmPA½  f2ðe2Þ

de2f1ðe1Þde1þ
R e1
Yra f1ðe1Þde1
o
þpj
R yra
e1
R e2
Max½e2 ;yraqmPA 
n
f2ðe2Þde2f1ðe1Þde1þ
R e1
yra f1ðe1Þde1
oo
.
3. mS ¼ kH ð1 pHÞ
R e1
YraS f ðe1Þde1 þ pH
R e1
yraS f ðe1Þde1
n o
þ
kLpL andProposition 15. If pL is sufficiently small, pH is sufficiently
large, and a > aS, then TPF ; TPA > TS. If both pL and pH are
sufficiently small and a > aS, then TPA > TS > TPF . If both pL
and pH are sufficiently large and a < aS, then T
PF > TS > TPA.
Proposition 15 presents sufficient conditions for rank-
ing the default rate. It implies that if both probabilities of
income shock are low and the pooling ARM rate is greater
than the separating ARM rate, then the pooling FRM con-
tract leads to the lowest default rate. If the probabilities
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borrowers differ greatly, then the separating contract leads
to the lowest default rate. If the probabilities of income
shock are high for both types of borrowers, then the default
rate is lowest under the pooling ARM contract. The intui-
tion for these results is straightforward: the higher the
probability of an income shock, the lower the default rate
will be when an ARM contract is adopted.
As mentioned earlier, a > aS indicates a higher likeli-
hood of dP
A
dak
j
< 0, and a < aS indicates a higher likelihood
of dP
A
dak
j
> 0. The results from the proposition above thus
imply the following: (1) when the negative house price
externalities have a large enough impact that a > aS, the
lowest default rate is likely to occur under the pooling
FRM contract or the separating contract; (2) when the neg-
ative house price externalities do not have a large enough
impact that a < aS, the pooling ARM contract may result
in the lowest default rate.
Recall from the previous section that (1) when the
impact from the negative house price externalities is extre-
mely large, a separating contract is more likely to be opti-
mal for the lender, and (2) when the impact from the
negative house price externalities is small enough that
the lender’s profit is still increasing in the ARM rate, pool-
ing contracts are more likely to occur.9 Although the results
from the default rate comparison are not completely in line
with those for the optimal contracts, they do overlap to a
large extent. For a social planner or a government agency
that aims to control the default rate under large house price
externalities, therefore, special attention should be paid to
the situation in which the pooling FRM contract offers the
lowest default rate while a > aS. Proposition 15 states that
if both pL and pH are sufficiently small and a > aS, then the
pooling FRM contract offers the lowest default rate. Accord-
ing to the results from the previous section, when a > aS,
the optimal contract for the lender is likely to be a separat-
ing contract in this situation, and this may lead to a higher
default rate. The rationale for an equilibrium contract with
a higher default rate lies in two driving forces: the low risk
of an income shock drives the low default rate under a pool-
ing FRM contract, while the presence of large house price
externalities makes the separating contract optimal for the
lender. Since both forces operate in this particular situation,
an equilibrium contract may not be socially desirable if the
goal is to minimize the default rate.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the relationships
among mortgage product choice, negative house price
externalities, and the default rate. The results suggest that
the presence of house price externalities has important
implications for the equilibrium menu of mortgage con-
tracts offered by lenders and adopted by borrowers, as well
as for the overall default rate. In the presence of negative9 This causes no contradiction with the results of Posey and Yavas (2001)
since both pooling and separating contracts are possible in their paper.house price externalities, a higher ARM rate triggers an
additional loss of earnings that would not otherwise occur
to the lender. As a result, the lender’s profits may be
decreasing in the ARM rate, and thus the equilibrium
ARM rate in a pooling equilibrium may exceed the equilib-
rium ARM rate that would be offered to high-risk borrow-
ers in a separating equilibrium. In consequence, when
externalities are large, the lender prefers to offer separat-
ing contracts, and high-risk borrowers receive a lower
interest rate than they would have received under a
pooling contract. When house price externalities are small,
the equilibrium will tend toward pooling contracts. The
ranking of the default rates follows a similar pattern as
the mortgage contracts. We have shown that when the
negative house price externalities have a large enough
impact, the pooling FRM contract or the separating
contract tends to offer the lowest default rate; when the
negative house price externalities do not have a large
enough impact, the pooling ARM contract may result in
the lowest default rate.
Appendix A
Proof (Proof of Lemma 1). Taking the derivative DVði;a; pjÞ
with respect to pj yields
@DVði;a;pjÞ
@pj
¼ UðYiÞþUð0ÞDdUðYiqmÞ
þ
R Yra
e1
ðUðYrae1ÞþdbAÞf1ðe1Þde1þR e1YraðUð0ÞDÞf1ðe1Þde1n o

R yra
e1
ðUðyrae1ÞþdbBÞf1ðe1Þde1þR e1yraðUð0ÞDÞf1ðe1Þde1n o:
One can see easily that when D is sufficiently large,
@DVði;a;pjÞ
@pj
< 0. hProof (Proof of Proposition 2). By the implicit function the-
orem, we have
@iða; p; jÞ=@pj ¼ 
@DVði;a; pjÞ=@pj
@DVði;a; pjÞ=@i
:
Since @DVði;a; pjÞ=@pj < 0 and @DVði;a; pjÞ=@i < 0, it fol-
lows that @iða; p; jÞ=@pj < 0. hLemma 16. If dP
A
dak
j
> 0, then ðmII mIIIÞðaIIH  aIIIH Þ > 0; if
dPA
dai
j
< 0; ðmII mIIIÞðaIIH  aIIIH Þ < 0. If pH is sufficiently large,
then mI > mIII.Proof. By Lemma 4, @P
A
@m < 0. When
dPA
dak
j
> 0;mk and akj affect
total earnings in opposite directions. Under such circum-
stance, in order to satisfy the zero-profit contract condi-
tion, a higher value of m must accompany a higher value
of aij. Therefore, the case with a higher ARM rate will have
a higher first-period default rate, and vice-versa. When
dPA
dak
j
< 0;m and akj affect total earnings in the same direc-
tion. Thus, a higher (lower) value of m must accompany a
lower (higher) value of akj . As a result, the case with a
higher ARM rate will have a lower first-period default rate,
and vice-versa. h
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A
dak
j
< 0,
a higher (lower) value of m must accompany a lower
(higher) value of akj . Thus, we have either aIIH < aIIIH and
mII > mIII , or aIIH > aIIIH and mII < mIII . When pL is sufficiently
small, we can see easily that low-risk borrowers have a
higher default rate in Case II than in Case III. For high-risk
borrowers, the relative default rate depends on the value of
akH , since the default rate function is the same for both
cases. Also, we know that dm
k
dak
j
> 0, so the default rate for
high-risk borrowers is increasing in aH . Suppose that
aIIH > aIIIH ; then the default rate for high-risk borrowers is
higher in Case II than in Case III. Since low-risk borrowers
also have a higher default rate in Case II than in Case III, it
must be true that mII > mIII , which causes contradiction.
Therefore, if dP
A
dak
j
< 0 and pL is sufficiently small, then
aIIH < aIIIH . When pL is sufficiently large, the proof follows
the same steps, so we omit it for simplicity. hProof (Proof of Proposition 10). The conditions in part (1)
guarantee that the lender has no incentive to offer a
pooling FRM contract, while the conditions in part (2)
guarantee that the lender has no incentive to deviate to a
separating contract. To prove part (2), it is necessary to
have iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ or iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L , since otherwise the lender
has an incentive to deviate to a separating contract (iIIIL ;aIIIH Þ
due to the fact that a > aIIIH . First, consider the situation in
which iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. In this sit-
uation, there exists a separating contract (eiL ;aIIIH ) whereeiL ¼ iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ. Since this contract is more attractive
to the lender, this situation cannot occur. Next, consider
the situation in which iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;
mIIÞ < iIIIL . In this situation, there exists a separating
contract (iIIIL ; eaH) where eaH > aIIIH if dPAða;pjÞda > 0. Unless
a 6 eaH , this contract would be more attractive to the len-
der as well. As a result, we must have the condition
a 6 eaH , which implies iIIIL P iða; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. h
Proof (Proof of Proposition 11). Since a 6 aIIIH , the only
possible attractive separating contract is (iIIIL ; eaH) when
iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. According to case
II, in this situation it is necessary to have a 6 eaH , which
requires iða; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 i
III
L if
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0. hProof (Proof of Proposition 12). Suppose that there exists a
pooling FRM contract; then, the lender must have no
incentive to deviate to a pooling ARM contract. This
implies that
DVði;a;pLÞ ¼ V
Fði;pL;mIÞ  V
Aða;pL;mIIðaÞÞP 0
DVði;a; pHÞ ¼ VFði

; pH;m
IÞ  VAða; pH;mIIðaÞÞP 0
:
(
ð7Þ
for all a such thatkPAða;pL;mIIÞ þ ð1 kÞPAða; pH;mIIÞP 0 ð8Þ
The conditions (7) imply that i 6 iða; pH;mI;mIIÞ <
iða; pL;mI;mIIÞ. Suppose that
dPAða;pjÞ
da > 0; then the condition
(8) implies that a P a. As a result, if i 6 iða; pH;mI;mIIÞ,
the lender has no incentive to deviate to a pooling ARM
contract. Thus, i 6 iða; pHÞ is necessary and sufficient to
exclude an ARM contract. Suppose that dP
Aða;pjÞ
da < 0; then
the condition (8) implies that a 6 a. As a result, the
condition i 6 iða; pH;mI;mIIÞ does not guarantee no devi-
ation to a pooling ARM contract unless a ¼ a. Thus, when
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0, the condition i

6 iða; pHÞ is necessary but
insufficient to exclude an ARM contract.
The conditions in part (1) guarantee that the lender has
no incentive to offer a pooling ARM contract, while the
conditions in part (2) guarantees that the lender has no
incentive to deviate to a separating contract. To prove
part 2), it is necessary to have iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ <
iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ or iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ <
iIIIL since, otherwise the lender has an incentive to deviate
to a separating contract (iIIIL ;aIIIH Þ. Since i

> iIIIL , the sepa-
rating contract (iIIIL ;aIIIH ) will attract both borrowers away
for a pooling FRM contract.with i. First, consider the
situation in which iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;
mIIÞ. In this situation, there exists a separating contract
(eiL ;aIIIH ) where eiL ¼ iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ. Unless i < eiL , this
separating contract will be more attractive than the
pooling FRM contract. Since dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0 , the separating
contract (iIIIL ; eaH) where iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼ iIIIL does not
exist. Next, consider the situation when iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;
mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L . In this situation, there exists
a separating contract (iIIIL ; eaH). Since i > iIIIL , this contract
would be more attactive, thus this situation must be ruled
out. As a result, we must have iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ <
iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ and i

< eiL which implies i < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;
mIIIÞ. Part 2) is proved. hProof (Proof of Proposition 13). According to the discussion
in case I under asymmetric information, when
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 i
III
L 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ, there exists a
separating contract ðiIIIL ;aIIIH Þ as long as there does not exist
a pooling contract. Next, we will prove that no pooling con-
tract exists that will attract both borrower types. Since
i > iIIIL and a > aIIIH , a pooling FRM contract with i
 and a
pooling ARM contract with a can never attract both bor-
rowers types. hProof (Proof of Proposition 14). The proof of Proposition 14
follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 13. To
ensure the existence of a separating equilibrium, the rates
must be offered so that no pooling contract can attract
both borrower types. That is why i > eiL and a > aIIIH are
necessary for the first separating equilibrium. For the sec-
ond separating equilibrium, the condition iða; pH;mI;mIIÞ
> iIIIL implies a > eaH , thus it is necessary. For the third
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III
L
implies a > eaH , thus it is necessary as well. h
Proof (Proof of Proposition 15). If pH is sufficiently large,
then TPF > TS, if pH is sufficiently small, then T
PF < TS. If
pL is sufficiently small and a > aS, then T
PA > TS; if pL is
sufficiently large and a < aS, then TPA < TS. The rest of
the rankings follows. hProposition 17. In summary, we have the following cases for
potential separating equilibria:
1. When iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 i
III
L 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ, there
may exist a separating contract ðiIIIL ;aIIIH Þ with zero
profits;
2. When iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ,
 there may exist a separating contract (eiL ;aIIIH ) where
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼ eiL < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ and eiL > iIIIL ;
 if dP
Aða;pjÞ
da < 0, there may exist another separating
contract (iIIIL ; eaH) where iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼
iIIIL < iðeaH; pL;mIII;mIIÞ and eaH < aIIIH .
3. When iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L ,
 if dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0, there may exist a separating contract
(iIIIL ; eaH) where iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iIIIL ¼ iðeaH; pL;mIII;
mIIÞ and eaH > aIIIH .
 if dP
Aða;pjÞ
da < 0, there does not exist a separating
contract.Proof (Proof of Proposition 17). Under a separating equilib-
rium, low-risk borrowers will choose the FRM contract and
high-risk borrowers will choose the ARM contract. Con-
sider a zero profit contract ðiIIIL ;aIIIH Þ. For type L borrowers,
the incentive compatibility constraint is
DVðiIIIL ;aIIIH ;pLÞ ¼ V
FðiIIIL ;pL;mIIIÞ  V
AðaIIIH ;pL;mIIðaIIIH ÞÞP 0:
ð9Þ
Let iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ be the FRM rate such that
DVði;aIIIH ; pLÞ ¼ 0. Since
@DVði;a;pjÞ
@i < 0, it follows that
iIIIL 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. For type H borrowers, the incentive
compatibility constraint is DVðiIIIL ;aIIIH ; pHÞ ¼ V
FðiIIIL ; pH;mIÞ
VAðaIIIH ; pH;mIIIÞ 6 0. Let iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ be the FRM rate
such that DVði;aIIIH ; pHÞ ¼ 0. It follows that i
III
L P iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ. Thus, we have the following necessary conditions
for zero-profit separating contracts.
iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 i
III
L 6 iðaIIIH ;pL;mIII;mIIÞ:
The separating equilibria with positive profits exist
either iIIIL < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ or iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L . Suppose i
III
L < iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;
mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ; then it will not be incentive com-
patible for type H borrowers to choose aIIIH if i
III
L is offered. Inorder to satisfy incentive compatibility for both types of
borrowers, the lender must increase the FRM rate or
decrease the ARM rate. Suppose that the lender increases
the FRM rate. Let eiL be the FRM rate such that iðaIIIH ; pH;
mI;mIIIÞ 6 eiL 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ. Consequently, the lender
makes positive profits from type L borrowers. In a compet-
itive market, eiL ¼ iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;mIIIÞ. Now consider the
option of decreasing the ARM rate. Let eaH be the ARM
rate such that iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ 6 iIIIL 6 iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ.
Suppose that dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0; then decreasing a
III
H will result
in negative payoffs, which will not be adopted. Suppose
dPAða;pjÞ
da < 0; then decreasing a
III
H will result in positive
payoffs. In a competitive market, the ARM rate eaH must
satisfy iðeaH; pH;mI;mIIIÞ ¼ iIIIL .Suppose that iðaIIIH ; pH;mI;
mIIIÞ < iðaIIIH ; pL;mIII;mIIÞ < i
III
L ; then condition (9) indicates
that it would not be incentive compatible for type L bor-
rowers to choose iIIIL if aIIIH is offered. In order to satisfy
incentive compatibility for both types of borrowers, the
lender must decrease the FRM rate or increase the ARM
rate. Decreasing the FRM rate will result in a negative pay-
off, which will not be adopted. Increasing the ARM rate is
possible only if dP
Aða;pjÞ
da > 0, since it would result in negative
payoffs otherwise. In a competitive market, the ARM rateeaH must satisfy iðeaH; pL;mIII;mIIÞ ¼ iIIIL . h
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